Ideas from 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic' by David Lewis [1968], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Philosophical Papers Vol.1' by Lewis,David [OUP 1983,0-19-503204-7]].
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
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11976
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Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
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11978
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Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
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11979
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It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
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16994
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Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke]
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11974
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Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do
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11975
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If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart
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11977
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Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts
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